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Abstract—Primary user emulation (PUE) attacks are an
emerging threat to cognitive radio (CR) networks in which
malicious users imitate the primary users (PUs) signals to limit
the access of secondary users (SUs). Ascertaining the identity of
the devices is a key technical challenge that must be overcome
to thwart the threat of PUE attacks. Typically, detection of
PUE attacks is done by inspecting the signals coming from
all the devices in the system, and then using these signals to
form unique fingerprints for each device. Current detection and
fingerprinting approaches require certain conditions to hold in
order to effectively detect attackers. Such conditions include the
need for a sufficient amount of fingerprint data for users or
the existence of both the attacker and the victim PU within the
same time frame. These conditions are necessary because current
methods lack the ability to learn the behavior of both SUs and
PUs with time. In this paper, a novel transfer learning (TL)
approach is proposed, in which abstract knowledge about PUs
and SUs is transferred from past time frames to improve the
detection process at future time frames. The proposed approach
extracts a high level representation for the environment at every
time frame. This high level information is accumulated to form
an abstract knowledge database. The CR system then utilizes this
database to accurately detect PUE attacks even if an insufficient
amount of fingerprint data is available at the current time frame.
The dynamic structure of the proposed approach uses the final
detection decisions to update the abstract knowledge database for
future runs. Simulation results show that the proposed method
can improve the performance with an average of 3.5% for only
10% relevant information between the past knowledge and the
current environment signals.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio (CR) is an emerging wireless paradigm that
enables wireless devices, called secondary users (SUs), to
share the available spectrum whenever the licensed primary
users (PUs) are idle [1]. However, this dynamic spectrum
sharing can introduce many security threats, one of which is
the primary user emulation (PUE) attack [2]. In PUE attacks, a
malicious attacker emulates the PU signals to force legitimate
SUs to vacate the spectrum even though no real PUs are
currently present. This type of attacks significantly decreases
the total performance of legitimate SUs and is detrimental to
the overall CR system.
Many defense and detection strategies have been proposed
to prevent PUE attacks in CR systems. These strategies fall
into the following main categories: authentication and en-
cryption based such as in [3], localization-based [2], transmit
power estimation techniques [4], and smart strategies based
This research was supported by Virginia Tech’s Institute for Critical
Technology and Applied Science (ICTAS) and the U.S. National Science
Foundation under Grant CNS-1524634.
on supervised machine learning techniques such as in [5]
and [6] or game theory [7]. For PU authentication and en-
cryption. the authors in [3] proposed to add helper nodes
to the system that authenticate PUs through link signatures,
and hence inform SUs with available spectrum. Within the
scope of localization-based techniques, the authors in [2]
exploited the received signal strength (RSS) distribution at
different locations in the system for device fingerprinting.
However, both the authentication and the localization-based
techniques will require additional nodes for authentication
or location reference, which can increase system complexity.
Localization-based techniques also assume the PUs to be
stationary with minimal channel variations, which is clearly
not the case in practical CRs in which users constantly change
their locations. In [4], the authors estimated the mean and the
variance of the received power at both a licensed PU and a
malicious user using Fenton approximation. These estimations
are compared with the probability ratio test on the received
signals to detect PUE attacks. However, these techniques
assume that the transmission power levels of attackers are
significantly different than the fixed known transmission power
levels of the PUs. Using neural networks, the authors in [5]
developed an approach to distinguish between PU and PUE
attacker. The use of belief propagation was proposed in [6],
in which each SU calculates the belief based on the local and
compatibility functions and the beliefs are exchanged between
neighboring users and then used to detect PUE attacks. The
work in [7] adopts a game-theoretic approach in which the
PUE defense problem is a dog fight game between defending
SUs and the attacker.
Previous supervised machine learning based techniques such
as in [5]–[7] require knowledge about users and authorized
signals. However, this kind of information is not always
available in real CR implementations. Device fingerprint-
ing [8] is a process to extract device-specific information
from the device transmitted signals. These fingerprints form
signatures that uniquely identify each individual PU or SU
in the system. Some of the features that can be used as
fingerprints [9] include the carrier frequency difference (CFD),
phase shift difference (PSD), and second-order cyclostationary
feature (SOCF). Since device fingerprinting requires no prior
knowledge about PUs and SUs, unsupervised machine learning
techniques can be used to detect PUE attacks. The authors
in [10] used an unsupervised Bayesian mixture model to clas-
sify fingerprints into different groups. Each group represents
a unique device in the system. A PUE attack is detected if
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two groups, physical devices, share the same ID, e.g. MAC
address. Another benefit of the unsupervised techniques is
that they are passive and require no additional hardware to
be added to the system unlike localization based techniques.
However, unsupervised fingerprinting techniques are applied at
each time frame independently. Therefore, sufficient amount of
fingerprints is required at each time frame, and it is required
to have fingerprints for both the malicious attacker and the
victim PU at the same time frame.
The main contribution of this paper is to propose a novel
transfer learning based framework in which knowledge from
past time frames is transferred to current time frame to
improve the final PUE attacks detection decisions. To our
knowledge, this paper is the first to develop a transfer learning
approach for device fingerprinting. Transferring knowledge is
significant in fingerprinting scenarios in which an insufficient
amount of fingerprints is available at the current time frame.
Our proposed framework extracts abstract information about
all SU and PU devices in the CR system. This abstract
knowledge is used to boost the output of an unsupervised
PUE attacks detection algorithm. The transfer learning part
in the proposed framework updates the abstract knowledge
after each time frame. Extensive simulations demonstrates that
the transfer approach improves the efficiency of PUE attacks
detection especially in the case of insufficient availability of
fingerprints. Results show that using the proposed framework
the performance is enhanced with an average of 3.5% for only
10% of relevant information between the past knowledge and
the current environment signals.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes our system model. In Section III we explain in
detail the proposed transfer learning framework. Simulation
results and discussions are presented in Section IV. Finally,
conclusions are drawn in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a CR system composed of PUs and SUs, with
the total number of PUs and SUs being N . Each user has
a unique identifier (ID), such as a MAC address. Secondary
users (SUs) can benefit from the spectrum only when all PUs
are idle. Hence, SUs observe the signals of active PUs to
avoid using the spectrum when it is used by a licensed PU.
In this model, we consider a PUE attack scenario in which a
malicious attacker copies the ID of one of the licensed PUs,
and, in turn, forces the SUs to vacate the spectrum due to the
fake PU-like signals sent from the attacker. The PUE attack
causes a serious security threat and significantly degrades the
total performance of the CR system.
Nevertheless, each device in the CR system, whether it
is a PU or an SU, transmits signals that include device-
specific information, such information is the carrier frequency
difference (CFD), phase shift difference (PSD), and second-
order cyclostationary feature (SOCF). Such device-specific
information is known to be unique to each transmitter [10], and
hence cannot be replicated by attackers. The process to extract
this device-specific information from the transmitted signals is
called device fingerprinting [8]. In device fingerprinting, the
extracted device-specific information, or fingerprints, forms
signatures that uniquely identify each device in the system.
Therefore, even though the PUE attacker shares the same ID
with a real PU, the fingerprint data for the attacker is different
from the fingerprint data for the attacked PU. Although our
model is applicable to any device fingerprint features, we
restrict our attention to the CFD, PSD, and SOCF.
To detect PUE attacks, a nonparametric Bayesian model can
be used, such as the one in [10]. In this model, fingerprinting
data is gathered from all the devices in the system and grouped
into different clusters. Since fingerprints are unique for each
device, each cluster of similar fingerprints belongs to one
device only. Therefore, the number of clusters represents the
real number of devices N in the system. The number of
clusters is a key factor to detect the existence of a PUE attack.
For example, if multiple clusters have the same ID, then a PUE
attack has occurred.
To form the clusters, one can adopt the nonparametric
approach proposed by Wood and Black [11], that uses the
infinite Gaussian mixture model (IGMM). In this model, the
number of clusters, or mixtures, could be infinite. Using an
IGMM, one can cluster a given set of data points, such
as the PUs’ and SUs’ fingerprints, by estimating a number
of Gaussian distributions, where each Gaussian distribution
represent a cluster. The IGMM therefore requires a mixture
input and a set of hyper-parameters β. These hyper-parameters
include priors on the mean and variance of the multivariate
Gaussian distributions. To integrate the hyper-parameters out
of the IGMM, the mixture input needs to be generated from
a distribution that is conjugate to the probability of the
priors, p(µk, σ2k|β) with µk being the mean and σ2k being
the variance. Hence, the Dirichlet distribution is used for the
mixing probability p(pi|α) with pi being the mixing weights
and α being the mixing parameter. The Dirichlet distribution
is given by
Dir(α1, . . . , αK) =
1
B(α)
K∏
i=1
wα1−1i , (1)
for all w1, . . . , wK > 0 where w1+ · · ·+wK = 1. B(α) is the
beta function, which can be expressed in terms of the gamma
function as follows:
B(α) =
∏K
i=1 Γ(αi)
Γ(
∑K
i=1 αi)
. (2)
The Gibbs sampling process is then used to iteratively assign
cluster labels to input data vectors, which in our case represent
assigning fingerprints fi to devices. Gibbs sampler starts by
initializing clusters for all the fingerprints fi. Subsequently, the
sampler removes the cluster label for one of the fingerprints
and calculates its probability for new cluster assignment. The
sampler iterates until convergence of all device assignments.
Convergence is guaranteed only for the case of infinite number
of fingerprints. In the real case in which a finite number of
fingerprints is available, a maximum number of iterations for
the Gibbs sampler is chosen as a stopping criterion.
Such a nonparametric Bayesian method can be applied to
a given set of fingerprints to detect PUE attacks. However,
most such existing models, such as in [10], are static and
they apply this method independently at every time period.
However, such static approaches require the CR system to have
a sufficient amount of unique fingerprints for each device in
the CR system to construct correct clusters for both the PUs
and the SUs. In such a nonparametric system, there might not
be a sufficient amount of fingerprint data for each device in the
system. Therefore, there is a need to handle the case of having
an insufficient amount of fingerprints to efficiently detect PUE
attackers. To address this problem, next, we propose a transfer
based framework in which fingerprinting results from past time
frames are used to enhance the current PUE attacks detection.
III. PROPOSED TRANSFER LEARNING FRAMEWORK
To enhance the fingerprinting process in a CR network, we
use the powerful mathematical tool of transfer learning [12].
In particular, we propose a new transfer learning based frame-
work for device fingerprinting, as illustrated in Fig. 1.
The proposed framework consists of two main components.
The first is the abstract knowledge database (AKD), which
is able to gather general information about devices in the
CR system from all time frames. The second component is
the transfer tool that updates the stored abstract knowledge
database with the current time frame information. The pro-
posed framework receives the current fingerprint data from
the environment, and suggests a clustering for the received
fingerprint data based on the knowledge in the AKD. The clus-
tering decisions from the proposed framework are merged with
the clustering decisions of the static nonparametric Bayesian
model to form a final clustering decisions. These final clus-
tering decisions represent the assignment of fingerprint data
to devices in the CR system. The transfer tool updates the
AKD with the final clustering decisions for future PUE attacks
detection.
Next, both the abstract knowledge database and the transfer
learning algorithm will be described in detail.
A. Abstract Knowledge Database
The abstract knowledge database (AKD) includes general
information about the devices in the CR system starting from
time t0, when the system was first deployed, and until the
current time instant t. The information stored in the AKD
consists of a set of fingerprints FDB, with DB referring
to the abstract knowledge database, grouped into multiple
clusters {CDB1 , CDB2 , . . . , CDBm }, where each cluster represents
a device in the CR system. The AKD block in Fig. 1
shows an example of 3 clusters of fingerprints. Hence, each
fingerprint fDBi ∈ FDB has a corresponding cluster label
CDBi ∈ {CDB1 , CDB2 , . . . , CDBm } and a weight value wi. Weights
represent the amount of confidence in assigning fingerprint
fDBi to cluster C
DB
i . To reduce the number of fingerprints in
the AKD, a similarity metric is introduced, which replaces two
or more fingerprints {fDBi ,fDB` , . . . } ∈ FDB that are nearly
identical with new fingerprint fDBy , where f
DB
y minimizes the
Bayesian Model
Decision
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Transfer Tool
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Fig. 1: Framework of the detection system with the proposed TL
approach
distances between {fDBi ,fDB` , . . . }:
fDBy : min
fDBy
∑
fDBx ∈X
d
(
fDBy , f
DB
x
)
, (3)
where d is a distance measure and X is the set of similar fin-
gerprints: X = {fDB1 , fDB2 , . . . } such that ∀(fDBi , fDB` ) ∈ X ,
d(fDBi , f
DB
` ) ≤ . Hence, the new set of fingerprints FDB
′
in the AKD equals to: FDB′ = {FDB ∪ {fDBy }} \ {X}.
For instance, if the distance measure is the l2-norm and
we have two fingerprints {fDB1 , fDB2 } with high similarity,
d(fDB1 , f
DB
2 ) ≤  then the new fingerprint fDB3 using (3) will
simply be the mean of both {fDB1 , fDB2 }. The distance threshold
 defines how close fingerprints need to be in order to be
considered similar. Large values of  allow more fingerprints
to be merged and hence will result in a very generic abstract
knowledge in the AKD. On the other hand, small values of 
tighten the similarity condition and result in a highly specific
information in the AKD.
When a new set of input fingerprint data F arrives from
the environment, the goal is to group these fingerprints into
clusters. In order to group the input fingerprints F , the
model compares these newly arriving fingerprints F with
the fingerprints FDB stored in the AKD to find the set of
fingerprints fDBi ⊂ FDB which is as close as possible to the
input fingerprints f` ⊂ F . Next, we use the clustering labels
of fDBi as a suggested clustering labels for f`. The model also
uses the weights wi associated with each fingerprint fDBi in the
AKD to provide a confidence level along with each suggested
clustering label. A sigmoid logistic growth function is chosen
to calculate the amount of confidence for each fingerprint in
the database:
CFi =
1
1 + b× e−cwi , (4)
where CFi is the confidence weight for the fingerprint fDBi , wi
is the weight associated with the fingerprint fDBi in the AKD,
b and c are the parameters of the logistic function that control
how steep the logistic function is which in turn affects the level
of confidence assigned to each weight. The initial weights are
chosen near the middle, based on the amount of confidence
Algorithm 1 Boosting labels of the Bayesian model
Input: Set of fingerprint data F from the environment
Output: Set of labels CDBi and confidence values CFi for all
fingerprints fi ∈ F
1: for each fingerprint fi in the input do
2: for each fingerprint fDBj in the AKD do
3: Calculate similarity between fi and fDBj
4: end for
5: idx← j (of the fDBj similar to fi)
6: CDBi ← labels of fDBidx
7: CFi = 1/[1 + b× exp (−c× widx)]
8: end for
9: return clustering labels CDB, confidence CF
that we want to assign to the newly added fingerprints in the
database.
At specific time intervals, all the weights in the database are
decreased by a fixed amount to reduce the confidence in old
fingerprints which have not been used in the past several time
frames. The parameters b and c in (4) determine how long it
takes for a fingerprint to be considered old and be removed
from the AKD.
Therefore, the output of our proposed framework is a
set of suggested clustering labels for the input fingerprints
fi. A confidence weight is also provided along with each
suggested clustering label. The suggested clustering labels
from our proposed framework boost the clustering decisions
of the Bayesian model to construct final clustering labels. The
boosting process pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 1.
B. Transfer Tool
The purpose of the transfer tool is to use the final output
decisions to update the AKD. At each time frame, both
the Bayesian model and our proposed framework receive
the current fingerprints fi from the environment, and group
these fingerprints into clusters CBYi and C
DB
i respectively. The
decision block, shown in Fig. 1, merges the output of the
Bayesian algorithm (fi, CBYi ) and the output of the proposed
framework (fi, CDBi ) into a final output decision (fi, Ci),
where fi is the input fingerprints, Ci is the final cluster labels
assignment. Since the final decisions have different labels than
the labels in the AKD, a mapping of labels is needed. The
transfer tool finds the right mapping of final decision labels
Ci to the labels in the AKD CDBi by solving:
min
M
S∑
i=1
I
(
M (Ci) , CDBi
)
, (5)
where S is the total number of fingerprints in F , M =
[m1,m2, . . . ,mv] is the mapping vector between final clus-
ter labels and cluster labels in the AKD such that mj ∈
{1, 2, . . . , V }, where V is the number of labels, for any two
elements mj and mk of M,mj 6= mk, I is an indicator
function in which I = 0 when M (Ci) = CDBi and I = 1
when M (Ci) 6= CDBi . For example, in the case of 2 clusters
only, M can take two possible values: M = [1, 2] or [2, 1].
After finding the right mapping of the labels from the final
clustering output Ci to the clustering labels CDBi in the AKD,
Algorithm 2 Updating the AKD
Input: Fingerprint data fi from the environment, and simi-
larity levels between fingerprints fi from the environment
and fingerprints fDBj from the AKD
Output: Updated AKD
1: Find the mapping of labels M (between framework output
labels and final output labels).
2: for each fingerprint fi with high similarity to fingerprint
fDBj in the AKD do
3: if fi label match the fDBj then
4: increase the weight of fDBj by wstep inc
5: else
6: decrease the weight of fDBj by wstep dec
7: add the new label mapping of fi to the AKD with
initial weight winit
8: end if
9: end for
10: for each fingerprint fi with low similarity to fingerprint
fDBj in the AKD do
11: add the new fingerprint fi with its label to the AKD
with initial weight winit
12: end for
13: decrease all weights for all fingerprints in the AKD by 1
the transfer tool updates the existing fingerprints fDBi in the
AKD with the final output labels of the input fingerprints
fi. In the update process, the input fingerprint data fi is
divided into two categories: fingerprints with high similarity
to the fingerprints fDBi in the AKD, and fingerprints with
low similarity to the fingerprints fDBi in the AKD. In the
high similarity case, we increase the weights wi for all the
fingerprints fDBi in the AKD that are of high similarity to
the input fingerprints fi to give these fingerprints a higher
confidence weight. As for the fingerprints with low similarity,
the input fingerprints fi are considered new to the AKD and
are added to the AKD with initial associated weights winit.
The algorithm used to update fingerprints in the AKD is shown
in Algorithm 2. After specific time intervals, the weights for
all the fingerprints in the database are decreased by 1 to
penalize for old unused fingerprints. All the fingerprints fDBi
with weights below a certain threshold are removed from the
AKD database.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For our simulations, we consider the nonparametric
Bayesian method as our static PUE attacks detection model,
and we evaluate the benefits of using our proposed transfer
based framework to enhance the detection of the PUE attacks
in the CR system.
A. Parameter Selection and Data Generation
Even though the hyper-parameters β were integrated out
of the iterative Gibbs process as shown in Section II, an
appropriate choice of hyper-parameters β affects the speed
of convergence of the Gibbs sampler. The hyper-parameters
β consist of priors to the µk and σk of the multivariate
Gaussian distributions. For example, The mean prior µ0 is
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
70
75
80
85
90
95
100
Hit rate comparison with/without the transfer approach
Number of fingerprints
H
it 
ra
te
 (%
)
 
 
Upper Bound on Transfer
Proposed Transfer Approach
Without Transfer
(a)
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
4.5
Effect of Transfer as the size of input data increase
Number of fingerprints
In
cr
ea
se
 in
 h
it 
ra
te
 (%
)
(b)
100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Detection of PUE attacks missclassified by traditional methods
Number of fingerprints
D
et
ec
tio
n 
(%
)
 
 
Proposed Transfer Approach
Without Transfer
(c)
Fig. 2: Comparison between the proposed transfer learning approach and the traditional static approach (a) hit rate vs number of fingerprints
(b) efficiency of using transfer learning vs number of fingerprints (c) percentage of PUE attacks detection vs number of fingerprints
usually set to be close to the mean value of all the fingerprints.
The hyper-parameter κ0, which is proportional to prior mean
for σk, determines how likely the fingerprints are to be
variant from each others. Therefore, for features like signal
amplitude, a large value of κ0 is chosen since signal amplitude
feature has large variance between fingerprints. On the other
hand, frequency features tend to have small variance between
fingerprints and hence a small value of κ0 is chosen for these
features. The Dirichlet distribution is used in the generation
of the fingerprints for the simulations. Random means and
variances are used for each label.
B. Experiments and Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the non-
parametric Bayesian model with and without our proposed
transfer learning framework. We use two main metrics for
evaluation: (i) The hit rate of assigning the right label to
each fingerprint, which is equals to the percentage of correctly
assigned labels to fingerprints compared to the total number
of fingerprints. (ii) Missed attack rate, which is an indicator
that missclassifying some fingerprints led into missclassifying
a user in the system.
The second metric provides a better indicator on the per-
formance enhancement due to using the transfer learning
framework, this is due to the fact that even with high hit
rate percentages, an attacker might not be detected if all the
missclassified fingerprints belong to this attacker. On the other
hand, even with low hit rate, accurate detection of attackers can
be achieved if the missclassified fingerprints are distributed on
various users. The conducted experiments were repeated 500
times and final results were averaged. The number of users
chosen is 8 with total number of fingerprints ranging from
100 to 1000 fingerprints. An upper bound on the transfer
learning approach is shown in the plots, which presents the
maximum hit rate possible with perfect transferred knowledge.
This upper bound curve gives us an insight on the maximum
performance that our proposed transfer approach can achieve.
In Fig. 2a, we show the hit rate resulting from the different
learning approaches as the number of fingerprints varies.
From this figure, we can see that our proposed framework
achieved an average enhancement of 3.5% in total hit rate (for
100 fingerprints) with only 10% of transferable knowledge.
Fig. 2a also shows that the transfer learning upper bound curve
yields to highest output hit rate if all the 10% transferable
knowledge were completely used. The figure also shows that
the maximum performance enhancement that can be reached
through transfer learning is around 4.1% making our model
up to 75% close to the optimal transfer case. As expected the
more fingerprints we have that describes users the better the
clusters are which yields to a higher total hit rate.
Fig. 2b shows the efficiency of using transfer learning as
the number of fingerprints increases. As more fingerprints are
available, there is less need to transfer knowledge and, thus,
the amount of performance improvement resulting from the
proposed approach will naturally decrease. This is due to the
fact that having a large number of fingerprints will yield in
a better clustering of labels by the detection algorithm which
leaves small room of enhancement for the transfer approach.
In Fig. 2c, we show the number of times that the proposed
transfer learning approach managed to correctly classify a PUE
attacker that was missclassified in the traditional detection
approach. As the number of fingerprints increases, missclas-
sifying an attacker is less likely to happen. This is due to the
fact that even if some fingerprints were missclassified, having
other correctly classified fingerprints insures that the attacker
is correctly detected. Fig. 2c shows that for 100 fingerprints
the proposed transfer approach detects 23% of the times an
attacker which was not detected in the traditional non-transfer
approach.
Fig 3 shows the effect of increasing the number of devices
on the total hit rate for a fixed number of fingerprints for
each user. In this experiment, we obtain 25 fingerprints for
each user. As expected the hit rate decreases as the number
of devices increases. For a fixed 10% transferable information
from past time frames, the figure shows that the effect of the
proposed method increases as the number of devices increases,
this is due to the fact that having 25 fingerprints for each
user is sufficient in the 10 users case, and as the number
of users increases, more fingerprints are needed to correctly
cluster users; and hence the more effective the transfer learning
approach becomes.
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Fig. 3: Hit rate comparison between the proposed and the traditional
approaches with respect to the number of devices
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a novel approach for
performing device fingerprinting in wireless networks. In
particular, we have introduced a novel framework, based on the
machine learning tools of transfer learning, that enable static
detection algorithms to benefit from past detection results. We
have applied the framework for fingerprinting PUs and SUs
in a cognitive radio network. Our results have shown that
the proposed framework enhanced the performance with an
average of 3.5% for only 10% relevant information between
the past knowledge and the current environment fingerprints.
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